University of Virginia Library

Models and Strategies for Social Action:
Pondering the Future

In examining the congregation for Reconciliation, it seems clear that their activities could not have been easily carried out as a social-action committee within a larger congregation. The role of the pastor as researcher, strategist, and promoter of commitment and group solidarity has been critical. It has been a full-time job. An assistant pastor in a large congregation would almost certainly have found himself under fire. Even the most sympathetic and skillful senior pastor would have had difficulty sheltering this type of group from the wrath of conservative lay people.

On a lesser scale, however, educational and facilitating ministries could be organized within other congregations. The model, of course, would vary depending on the size of the congregation and the cadre of concerned lay people. In larger congregations, a model might resemble the Cincinnati experiment. There is no easy blueprint for this, but certain imperatives do seem evident. First is a sympathetic and skillful senior pastor who will encourage and facilitate, while running interpretive interference with conservative laity. Second is an assistant pastor knowledgeable and political enough to defend the legitimacy and credibility of the group, while heading off abrasive activities and statements by the members. Precarious business, to be sure, but a worthy challenge.

Such ecclesiola en ecclesia approaches might eventually develop into action congregations. Governing bodies, not unlike the Miami Presbytery, would have difficulty denying official congregational status. At the same time, efforts toward independence need

be charted cautiously. Without first achieving sufficient size and commitment for self-sustenance, autonomy would spell early death.

Let us turn now to the question of the prospects for creating congregations modeled after the Dayton experiment. Our admiration for their accomplishments is tempered by the realization of the conservative tide sweeping through liberal Protestant denominations. We see little hope for a rapid ebb, and thus church leaders face severe restraints in experimenting. To deliberately maneuver to create congregations modeled after the Dayton experiment with denominational funds is to invite discord and reprisal, not reconciliation. Some church governing units might birth and support experimental congregations of this nature without suffering serious retaliation, but their number is few.

Abandonment of the Dayton model would be an equally foolish move. Rather, church leaders need to open ways outside normal denominational funding structures to offer such groups life. We do not suggest clandestine laundering of monies through the National Council of Churches, but rather seeking new sources of support. Some few foundations and philanthropists in America are dedicated to promoting progressive social change. Similarly, there is the possibility of tapping private contributions from progressive well-to-do lay persons. Contributions of $5,000 to $7,000 per year for three or four years from two or three lay persons could launch a Dayton-type venture. Further, a potential pastor's professionally trained wife might subsidize a social-action congregation by assuming the task of family financial support. Outside the church, at least, our society is witnessing some families with women in this role.

The reluctance of the Miami Presbytery to either sanction the Congregation for Reconciliation or deny it permanent status probably forecasts the prospects of other governing bodies' accepting social-action congregations. That this type of group maintain independence from denomination monies becomes critical. We base this analysis on three assumptions. First, the dominant mood among lay people is vehement opposition to social action, especially confrontation-type action, by the churches. Second, church resources expended in opposition to this mood

will bring even more serious reprisals than in the late 1960s. And third, such dissension will contribute nothing to the cause.

We believe our assumptions are sound. They are, nonetheless, assumptions and, as such, open to challenge. While we would place our bets on the validity of the first two conjectures, data to support or refute are simply not available. We believe, however, that most of the data available do point to these conclusions. How to assemble adequate data for definite answers ought to be a high priority of church leaders interested in promoting active church participation in social action.

Our third assumption is a conservative sociological bias. We see institutions as terribly precarious structures men create to accomplish goals and transmit and sustain ideologies. While we decry the personalists who would tailor religion into a purely private or group affair sans corporate responsibilities, we also shudder at the prospects of unwitting activists unraveling liberal Protestantism. Our "middle-of-the-road" posture thus expresses not only a conclusion as to how Protestant leaders ought to maximize their effectiveness but also our theoretical understanding of the social order. Groups like the Congregation for Reconciliation can stimulate change in their communities. They can also be much more effective than the Dayton group in stimulating change within the churches. But the challenge is still one of planning and structuring to limit repercussions.

We will return to this in a moment. Let us first consider further the possibility that our first two assumptions are either wrong or out of focus, and thus our vision clouded. We see conservatism widespread throughout liberal Protestant congregations. Assume, though, that any denomination embodies a sizable number of congregations with a majority of members concerned more with social change, the quality of human life, and a just social order than with personal financial gain and comfort. If this should be the case and it is possible to identify these congregations, then very different strategy options might emerge. Alone they are too small to fight the conservative tide of the denomination. Together they could explore ways of asserting their will. One prospect might parallel the present struggle within the conservative Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod. As we write, moderates, with their backs pushed to the wall by arch-fundamentalist President

Jacob A. O. Preus, are exploring means of splitting into a separate denomination. This conceivably could be a viable option for action-oriented Christians in liberal Protestantism. It is an idea far more sensible than trying to push a denomination further than its members prefer to go. Even assuming the possibility of activists permanently gaining the upper hand in a liberal denomination, the loss of membership coupled with outstanding property mortgages would be likely to leave them either bankrupt or so preoccupied for years with fiscal matters and litigations that they wouldn't have time, money, or staff to concern themselves with social issues.

To repeat, we view developments along this line as problematic. They fall outside the parameters of our own value presuppositions. Those who must shape the future of liberal Protestantism, however, are not bound by our presuppositions. They are bound by what is structurally and ideologically true. And our central argument is that to change structures and ideologies requires maximum utilization of factual knowledge, theory, imagination, and will. To expect the pieces to fit together with anything less is to leave too much to providence.